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Communities Plan for 
Range of Emergencies
Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001, the importance of public health 
preparedness generally and surge capacity 
specifically—the ability to rapidly expand 
to meet the greatly increased demand for 
medical care and public health from large 
numbers of people—has been paramount 
to policy makers and health care organi-
zations. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
other local disasters have further high-
lighted the need. Federal, state and local 
governments have expended considerable 
effort to prepare for disasters, emphasiz-
ing local plans since local agencies and 
organizations are the first responders in 
an emergency. Federal funding for bioter-
rorism preparedness, mostly directed to 
state and local agencies, spiked after 9/11 
(see box on page 3 for a description of 
federal agencies involved in surge capacity 
development).1
Following an initial focus on intention-
al use of biological agents, federal funding 
has become more flexible to respond to a 
range of potential emergencies, including 
manmade and natural disasters. Within 
this “all-hazards” approach, attention 
to a potential pandemic influenza has 
increased over the past year. Concerns 
that avian flu could spread worldwide 
evoke the 1918-19 flu pandemic that 
killed approximately 675,000 Americans 
and 50 million people worldwide.2 The 
Since Sept. 11, 2001, communities have responded to the federal call 
to enhance health care surge capacity—the space, supplies, staffing 
and management structure to care for many injured or ill people dur-
ing a terrorist attack, natural disaster or infectious disease pandemic. 
Communities with varied experience handling emergencies are building 
broad surge capacity, including transportation, communication, hospital 
care and handling mass fatalities, according to a new study by the Center 
for Studying Health System Change (HSC). Communities rely on federal 
funding to help coordinate and plan across agencies and providers, con-
duct training and drills, recruit volunteers, and purchase equipment and 
stockpile supplies. The current federal focus on pandemic influenza has 
helped prepare for all types of emergencies, although at times communi-
ties struggle with fragmented and restrictive funding requirements. 
Despite progress, communities face an inherent tension in developing 
surge capacity. The need for surge capacity has increased at the same 
time that daily health care capacity has become strained, largely because 
of workforce shortages, reimbursement pressures and growing numbers 
of uninsured people. Payers do not subsidize hospitals to keep beds empty 
for an emergency, nor is it practical for trained staff to sit idle until a 
disaster hits. To compensate, communities are trying to develop surge 
capacity in a manner that supports day-to-day activities and stretches  
existing resources in an emergency. Many of these efforts—including 
integrating outpatient providers, expanding staff roles and adapting 
standards of care during a large-scale emergency—require greater coor-
dination, guidance and policy support. As time passes since 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina, federal funding for surge capacity has waned, and 
communities are concerned about losing surge capacity they have built. 
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2u.S. Department of Homeland Security 
has identified 14 additional scenarios to 
prepare for, including natural disasters, 
chemical, radiological, nuclear and other 
biological incidents. 
Federal agency guidance and research 
are generally consistent about the main 
components needed for surge capacity: a 
management structure and communica-
tion systems, equipment and supplies, 
facilities, and personnel.3 
Management Structure and 
Communication Systems. In an emergency, 
an overarching management structure 
is critical to lead the response, assign 
responsibilities and allocate equipment 
and personnel. To receive federal fund-
ing, communities must comply with the 
Federal emergency Management Agency’s 
National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), which provides standards for 
coordinating across jurisdictions and disci-
plines. However, lack of clarity about which 
agency or sector is responsible for various 
components—including how each relates 
to the overall government command struc-
ture—can hamper a unified command.4  
Equipment and Supplies. A variety 
of equipment, supplies and medications 
must be on hand for use in major emer-
gencies to keep facilities in operation and 
support patient care, including special-
ized items for specific threats, such as 
anti-viral drugs for an influenza outbreak. 
Stockpiles and supply chains have been 
developed at the national, state and local 
levels to help provide medical and non-
medical supplies during an emergency.
Facilities. During an emergency, health 
care providers must create additional 
physical space. The u.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
estimates that a severe pandemic flu 
would require hospitalization of nearly 
10 million people, yet only about 1 mil-
lion staffed hospital beds are available.5 
Redirecting hospital rooms from routine 
uses could provide additional capacity, as 
could planning for how to use, staff and 
supply non-medical buildings and tempo-
rary structures 
Personnel. A large-scale emergency 
would require significant numbers of clin-
ical and public health professionals to care 
for victims in an emergency. Yet, given 
workforce shortages, especially for nurses,6 
hospitals need viable strategies to activate 
volunteers and workers from elsewhere 
and appropriately allocate existing staff. 
Despite attention to these key compo-
nents, significant concerns remain about 
communities’ ability to carry out a surge 
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Data Source
This study examined surge capacity in six communities from the Community Tracking 
Study (CTS), an ongoing study of local health care markets in 12 nationally representa-
tive metropolitan communities.  Based on preliminary findings from the 2007 CTS 
site visits, researchers selected six communities that demonstrated a significant level of 
activity around surge capacity development: Boston; Greenville, S.C.; Miami; Phoenix; 
Orange County, Calif.; and Seattle. Interviews also were conducted with officials in New 
York City, Washington, D.C., and New Orleans, as well as with national leaders. Fifty-
four interviews were conducted between November 2007 and january 2008 with repre-
sentatives of state and local emergency management agencies and health departments, 
hospital emergency preparedness coordinators and other organizations working on 
surge capacity. A two-person research team conducted each interview, and notes were 
transcribed and jointly reviewed for quality and validation purposes.  Interview data 
were coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software package. 
in capacity and their capability to attend 
to the specialized needs of affected people. 
Previous studies have suggested that surge 
capacity remains inadequate in the united 
States because of resource constraints, the 
challenges of inter-agency and cross-juris-
dictional coordination, and multiple federal 
guidelines and requirements.7 Moreover, 
federal policy makers often lack direct 
relationships with communities as many 
federal funds are distributed through the 
states, and research on community-level 
surge capacity has been limited. 
This study examines community-level 
surge capacity development and variation 
across six communities: Boston; Greenville, 
S.C.; Miami; Phoenix; Orange County, 
Calif.; and Seattle (see Data Source). To 
place these communities’ perspectives 
in a broader context with communi-
ties that have particular experience with 
large-scale disasters, interviews also were 
conducted with officials in New York City, 
Washington, D.C., and New Orleans, as 
well as with national leaders.
The communities have varied experi-
ence with large-scale emergencies, based on 
geography and other factors, but all con-
sider themselves at risk. The 9/11 attacks 
appreciably affected New York City and 
Washington, D.C., although the number 
of people needing medical care was rela-
tively low. Hurricane Katrina had broad 
and long-term impact on the New Orleans 
health care system—both in the numbers of 
people needing care and damage to medical 
facilities. Communities such as Miami and 
Orange County have been developing surge 
capacity for years because of the risk of 
natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earth-
quakes and wildfires. Phoenix, on the other 
hand, has had less exposure to natural 
disasters but recently heightened its focus 
on surge capacity given challenges serving 
a rapidly growing population and preparing 
to host several large public events in 2008. 
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Funding Drives Many  
Surge Capacity Activities
Communities rely heavily on federal fund-
ing for surge capacity development because 
state and local funding is minimal. Some 
funding is allocated to states or communi-
ties based on perceived risk or need, while 
other funding is distributed through com-
petitive grants. Respondents reported that 
federal funding has raised awareness of the 
need for surge capacity in communities 
and enabled people to dedicate time to cre-
ate plans, conduct drills, develop volunteer 
corps and purchase equipment and supplies. 
Federal funding is fragmented, however, 
coming from several sources with varied 
requirements, making it difficult for com-
munities to pursue a comprehensive strat-
egy. Although respondents viewed the fed-
eral focus on pandemic flu as appropriate 
overall, in some cases funding restrictions 
preclude investment in risks seen as impor-
tant locally. As a state official in Florida 
remarked, “Requirements and restrictions 
made it difficult to fit into that overarch-
ing strategy, which leaves some things we 
believe to be important with no funding 
source because each funding source has a 
box.”  Respondents urged greater integra-
tion of various guidelines and development 
of meaningful and usable benchmarks to 
track progress across core surge capac-
ity components. Some expressed opti-
mism about the collaboration between 
the university of Pittsburgh’s Center for 
Biosecurity and the HHS Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (ASPR) toward this end.
Further, respondents reported that 
funding levels are insufficient, particularly 
compared with the costs of developing 
hospital surge capacity. The Center for 
Biosecurity estimates that hospital costs to 
prepare for a pandemic well exceed ASPR 
funding.8 Health care financing does not 
support having hospital beds, equipment 
or workers sit idle, a fundamental tension 
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Key Federal Agencies and National Organizations    
that Guide Surge Capacity Development
· department of homeland security (dhs)
 · Federal emergency Management agency (FeMa) pro-
vides guidance and funding through the national response 
Framework. 
· department of health and human services (hhs) coordinates 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 (Public Health & Medical 
services) of the national response Framework and provides 
guidance and funding through:
· centers for disease control and Prevention (cdc) for public 
health functions, such as labs and disease surveillance. The 
CDC also funds university-based Centers for Public Health 
Preparedness that work with local and regional partners to 
strengthen their surge response plans.
· assistant secretary for Preparedness and response (asPr) 
for health care system functions, such as hospital care. 
· agency for healthcare research and Quality (ahrQ), which 
develops benchmarks and models for surge planning.
· the Joint commission, an accreditation group, includes surge 
capacity guidelines and requirements as part of its hospital 
accreditation process.
with surge preparedness since neither pub-
lic nor private payers subsidize such capac-
ity. Reimbursement pressures and grow-
ing numbers of uninsured people leave 
hospitals increasingly likely to focus on 
profitable services,9 which surge capacity is 
not. As one hospital respondent explained, 
“There is the tension of wanting to be 
prepared against the competing priority of 
not having the budget to do so.” A recent 
report by congressional Democrats warned 
that pending federal Medicaid changes 
would decrease funding for teaching and 
public hospitals, further challenging their 
ability to respond to disasters.10
Although increased funding would 
not address every challenge—it is not 
feasible to stockpile staff, for example—
respondents commonly reported that 
additional funds could help address general 
workforce shortages and provide more 
emergency response training. Moreover, 
federal funding for surge capacity has 
declined in recent years, and respondents 
are concerned about having the resources 
to maintain the plans, systems, training 
and supplies they have established.
Planning, Coordination Key
Communities are attempting to build 
broad surge capacity, ranging from com-
munication to transportation to hospital 
care to handling mass fatalities. To effec-
tively do so, respondents stressed the 
importance of ongoing planning and coor-
dination among stakeholders to determine 
who has resources, who has authority and 
who to request help from. To that end, one 
of the early benefits of federal funding after 
9/11 was improved coordination among 
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public health agencies, fire and police 
departments, emergency management 
agencies, and health care providers.11  
Lessons from past emergencies have 
prompted health agencies to partner with 
more entities. Hurricane Katrina, for 
example, highlighted the need for police 
to provide adequate security at hospitals 
and other sites. State and local emergency 
management agencies and emergency 
medical services (eMS) have become more 
involved, particularly in transportation 
for workers and victims, as have morgues 
and mortuaries in planning for mass fatali-
ties. Although many hospitals have long 
participated in collaborative community 
planning, some communities, such as the 
King County Health Care Coalition in 
Seattle, are pulling together broader hospi-
tal consortiums and work more closely with 
hospital associations. Community efforts 
increasingly involve community health 
centers (CHCs) and long-term and mental 
health care providers to address the distinct 
needs of vulnerable populations. 
Organizations and communities are also 
creating incident command structures to 
enable a common and effective response 
within and across entities. Many communi-
ties have a unified command structure, in 
which the lead agency activates the emer-
gency operations center, the central coor-
dinating body. Fire or police might lead 
initially, with the public health and health 
care community brought in when a public 
health or medical response is needed. In 
Boston, the local public health commis-
sion leads a unified command structure, 
including representatives of eMS, hospitals, 
CHCs and the state health department. In 
contrast, respondents in Phoenix cited a 
lack of coordination among such groups as 
a barrier to their response plans. 
Communities are developing their abil-
ity to “go it alone” for a few days after a 
disaster or much longer during a severe 
pandemic because the breadth of the event 
would limit outside assistance. They also 
are attempting to improve coordination 
across regional, state and federal levels to 
arrange for outside assistance when pos-
sible, which often requires overcoming legal 
and political challenges. Respondents in 
New Orleans and other communities noted 
that the lack of clear lines of communica-
tion and authority among jurisdictions 
hampered response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Respondents extolled the virtues of 
frequent exercises and drills that simulate 
an emergency to familiarize stakeholders 
with the response plan and identify gaps. 
Hospitals conduct their own drills and 
exercises each year, often in concert with 
community-wide efforts, with some exercis-
es focusing on a particular aspect of surge 
capacity. Large-scale exercises are expensive 
and difficult to organize since participants 
must also care for real patients, so a number 
of exercises are “tabletops,” where leaders 
across sectors meet to discuss response 
scenarios and processes. In addition, many 
communities use scheduled events, such as 
marathons, to test their plans. 
Inadequate communication is a com-
mon problem identified through real 
emergencies and exercises. Communities 
have ramped up communication systems 
to be interoperable across various organi-
zations, reliable so they can withstand the 
elements, and redundant, assuming that 
some systems will fail. Many communities 
have developed Web-based information 
portals at hospitals and public health and 
emergency management agencies and use 
800 megahertz radios and ham radio net-
works, staffed by community volunteers, as 
back-up systems. Respondents, nonetheless, 
stressed the need for clearer communica-
tion processes, messaging and training so 
that all stakeholders understand the status 
of a situation and what to do in response. 
As a hospital respondent in New York City 
explained, “using equipment is not that 
stressful, but it’s what you say, how you say 
it, and how you communicate it—that’s 
something we have virtually no training in.” 
Stockpiling Supplies 
To care for many people in an emergency, 
states, communities and hospitals are 
stockpiling medical equipment and sup-
plies. Respondents reported that federal 
funding often favors purchase of such items 
because they are more tangible and quanti-
fiable than training. Common acquisitions 
include decontamination showers for use 
in a chemical event, the anti-viral drug 
Tamiflu and ventilators for pandemic flu, 
and cots and personal protective equipment 
for a host of threats. Past emergencies also 
have stressed the need to ensure facilities 
have the basics—water, food and generator 
fuel—to remain operational and take care 
of patients. 
Hospitals struggle with the costs of stor-
age, maintenance and training associated 
with emergency equipment and supplies. 
Financial pressures have required hospi-
tals to use just-in-time inventories where 
they purchase only enough to meet their 
day-to-day needs. Federal inventory and 
auditing requirements, the need to rotate 
and replace expired drugs, and training on 
specialized equipment require additional 
staff or place additional requirements on 
existing staff, costs which are not often 
covered by federal grant funding. As one 
respondent bemoaned, “everyone is big on 
Communities are developing their 
ability to “go it alone” for a few 
days after a disaster or much 
longer during a severe pandemic 
because the breadth of the event 
would limit outside assistance.
buying the decontamination tent, buying 
this, buying that, and throwing money at 
the problem. If you can’t train people to 
use that ‘thing,’ it’s a big white elephant in 
my mind.” In response, some states and 
local governments have purchased stan-
dardized equipment and supplies to share 
or distribute among hospitals in an emer-
gency, and some hospitals have mutual-
aid agreements to share essential items. 
Seattle has developed a software system 
called KCHealthTrac that will coordinate 
the distribution of supplies across facilities 
during an emergency.
Further, respondents urged a shift in 
focus to equipment and supplies that can 
be helpful both in an emergency and on a 
daily basis. easing of federal requirements 
could allow durable items purchased with 
surge capacity monies, such as wheelchairs 
and cots, to be used during routine crowd-
ing. Similarly, a Greenville hospital respon-
dent praised the flexibility to purchase 
items with multiple uses, such as a man-
nequin they routinely use for training on 
a number of medical interventions. As the 
respondent noted, “Toys are nice, but you 
can’t buy a bunch of stuff that only gets 
pulled out for training and not for actual 
use, when you can buy stuff that will help 
on a day-to-day basis and improve the 
situation when there is a surge.”
Strategies to Create Space
In an emergency, hospitals expect to be 
inundated with additional patients, their 
families and friends, and others who 
simply seek a safe haven. Hospitals have 
worked to determine how to maximize 
existing space, for example, by using 
conference rooms and cafeterias for sleep-
ing quarters, converting single patient 
rooms into double rooms and placing 
patients in clinic or procedure areas or 
on cots in hallways. These “alternate use” 
plans include determining the types of 
patients best cared for in those spaces, as 
well as the staffing and other resources 
needed. A number of communities, such 
as Greenville and Miami, have plans to set 
up medical tents outside, although Boston 
does not rely on tents because of the 
colder climate.  
Inadequate staffing levels limit the 
degree to which additional spaces are 
useable for patient care. Many hospitals 
suffer from a shortage of staffed beds, 
which hinders their ability to take in 
more patients.12 In an emergency, hos-
pitals could free up staffed beds by first 
discharging patients who could safely go 
home and canceling elective procedures. 
A Washington, D.C., hospital respondent 
pointed to their accomplishment during 
9/11 of discharging almost a quarter of the 
hospital’s patients in four hours—consis-
tent with the federal benchmark to free 
up 20 percent of hospital bed space that 
many communities are working toward—
as reassurance that patients and physicians 
can rise to the occasion. 
Canceling elective procedures is a 
short-term strategy, however, and likely 
not viable during a pandemic. Forgoing 
elective procedures also would reduce 
a key source of hospital revenue, and a 
Boston respondent indicated hospitals are 
reluctant to jeopardize revenues without 
assurances that other hospitals will do the 
same. Furthermore, a few respondents 
stressed that most elective procedures 
are medically necessary and could not be 
postponed indefinitely.
Community and regional efforts seek 
to create systems to identify available beds 
among hospitals and coordinate sending 
patients to a facility with space. Boston, 
Greenville, Seattle and Phoenix have real-
time, Web-based bed tracking systems 
that indicate which facilities have capacity 
to take more patients. Although vital in an 
emergency, hospitals also use the systems 
to manage routine crowding. 
Strategies to move patients among hos-
pitals are limited to relatively contained 
events and when transportation is pos-
sible. For example, although hospitals in 
Miami routinely take in patients evacuated 
from the Florida Keys during moder-
ate hurricanes, patient evacuations were 
more difficult during Hurricane Katrina. 
enhanced use of telemedicine could help 
share resources when space is tight or 
transportation difficult: in Phoenix, tele-
medicine has enabled the state’s only burn 
center to help 10 area hospitals to each 
care for two to three burn patients. 
Communities also are making arrange-
ments with non-traditional facilities, such 
as schools, churches, hotels or convention 
centers, that could be used as alternate 
care sites in a large-scale emergency. 
During the 2006 windstorms in Seattle, for 
instance, a community college was used to 
house residents of a nursing home where 
power failed. Often, however, communities 
need assistance to gain the participation of 
such alternative facilities. Although Boston 
and Phoenix respondents were relatively 
confident in their ability to expand into 
non-traditional space because of their 
strong relationships with these facili-
ties, Miami and New Orleans have faced 
resistance from facilities concerned about 
potential negative publicity, liability and 
loss of business. 
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inadequate staffing levels limit the degree to which additional spaces 
are useable for patient care. Many hospitals suffer from a shortage of 
staffed beds, which hinders their ability to take in more patients.
Stretching Staff
even if additional space can be made 
available in an emergency, communi-
ties are most concerned about having an 
adequate workforce to make such space 
usable for patient care. The day-to-day 
shortages of key health personnel—such 
as nurses, physicians, pharmacists, labora-
tory technicians and respiratory thera-
pists—exacerbate the challenge of having 
sufficient numbers of health workers in 
an emergency. As physicians increasingly 
practice outside of hospitals, many emer-
gency departments (eDs) face significant 
challenges getting specialists to serve on 
call on a daily basis.13 Moreover, some 
respondents expect approximately 40 per-
cent of staff will not report for work dur-
ing emergencies. Communities and hospi-
tals are pursuing a number of avenues to 
address these workforce limitations.
Staff-sharing arrangements. 
Agreements to distribute staff on the 
basis of need can help surge response. For 
example, Boston and Greenville hospitals 
have established memoranda of under-
standing to share physicians and nurses 
if an event affects some facilities more 
than others. Such agreements could be 
of limited value in large-scale events. As 
a Washington, D.C., hospital respondent 
lamented, “The reality is that, if it’s a 
regional event, everybody’s competing for 
the same pool of people. There are just not 
a lot of pharmacists, doctors or nurses.” 
Some respondents suggested enhanced 
efforts to cluster patients by needs and 
allocate specialists among hospitals 
accordingly to gain economies of scale in 
patient care. 
Volunteers. Many communities are 
expanding their Medical Reserve Corps 
(MRC), local bodies of mostly medical 
professionals who agree to assist during an 
emergency. The national MRC includes 
more than 150,000 volunteers,14 with New 
York City’s corps the largest at approxi-
mately 7,000. Communities are at differ-
ent stages of developing the emergency 
System for Advance Registration of 
Volunteer Health Professionals (eSAR-
VHP) database, a requirement by ASPR 
to rapidly verify volunteers’ identities and 
privileges to facilitate their deployment to 
health care facilities. In some cases, as in 
Hurricane Katrina, respondents reported 
that volunteers bring limited benefit 
because they need significant direction 
and support. Others think enhanced plan-
ning, training and more routine use of 
volunteers would improve their effective-
ness; a Boston respondent stressed that a 
“just add water” system must be in place. 
Worker resiliency. Rather than expect-
ing many health care workers to come in 
from elsewhere, hospital and emergency 
managers are focusing on ways to ensure 
that their own staff present for work in 
an emergency—what one respondent 
described as “worker resiliency.”  Hospitals 
are developing plans to dedicate space, 
food and other care for staff members’ 
families and pets during an emergency 
to enable staff to come to work. In a 
pandemic flu scenario, plans to provide 
prophylaxis to staff and their families are 
common. Additionally, communities with 
significant disaster experience, such as 
New Orleans and Miami, have divided 
staff into two teams—one team works the 
initial hours of an emergency, the second 
team replaces it—to create clear expecta-
tions and reduce fatigue. Some New York 
City hospitals have made participation 
in emergency response a condition of 
admitting privileges for physicians, but 
the strength of these arrangements has not 
been tested. A few respondents suggested 
allocating federal funding toward hazard-
ous duty pay as an incentive to work dur-
ing an emergency. 
Expanding staff roles. Health organiza-
tions are trying to stretch available staff 
by expanding their roles in an emergency. 
Respondents at multiple levels of govern-
ment and hospital management acknowl-
edged that workers frequently perform 
outside of their normal roles during an 
emergency, but few have policies outlining 
those roles. California plans to assign state 
workers additional roles, based on their 
skills, during a disaster. New York City has 
conducted extensive training with hospital 
staff, including security guards and greet-
ers, to triage patients for pandemic flu. 
Along with liability concerns, hospitals 
across the communities fear that expand-
ing clinicians’ scope of care could jeop-
ardize their accreditation and reimburse-
ment. To some extent this is a state issue, 
because states determine the scope of 
practice for licensed health professionals. 
Adapting standards of care. Hospitals 
and other providers would likely need 
to ration or reduce the level of care pro-
vided during an emergency. ASPR and 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality have published approaches for 
providing the highest possible standard 
of care given austere conditions.15 even 
so, respondents noted the need for poli-
cies to help them allocate limited staff and 
other resources in an emergency. Some 
communities, such as New York City, New 
Orleans and Seattle, have started initiatives 
to modify care protocols in an emergency, 
such as distribution of ventilators during a 
pandemic flu or the number of emergency 
responders or nurses attending to each 
patient. 
Controlling Demand for 
Hospital Services  
Greater involvement of other types of 
health care providers is needed to take 
some of the pressure off of hospitals dur-
ing an emergency. Communities are trying 
to overcome what a Greenville respondent 
described as “the status quo, which has 
always been to go to the hospital.” efforts 
to engage other providers and encourage 
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patients to use them could also help reduce 
day-to-day use of the eD for non-emergent 
conditions.
Communities are increasingly looking 
to specialized providers—such as long-term 
care and mental health facilities—to remain 
operational during an emergency and 
respond to their patients’ needs. The Miami 
community has worked more closely with 
dialysis centers and other health care pro-
viders on preparedness after a hurricane 
caused dialysis centers to lose electric-
ity and shut down, and dialysis patients 
inundated hospitals for treatment. Further, 
behavioral health services provide impor-
tant support to families of victims and to 
response workers during and after an event.
Additionally, given some respondents’ 
estimates that many people presenting to 
hospitals in an emergency could be “walk-
ing wounded,” care can be provided at other 
sites. The emergency Medical Treatment & 
Labor Act (eMTALA) has been amended 
to allow eDs to relocate patients for screen-
ing during a pandemic outbreak. Some 
local agencies are collaborating with other 
providers to identify screening sites to 
take pressure off of hospitals and assessing 
situations when it would be more help-
ful for practitioners to remain in their 
respective facilities to treat patients, rather 
than potentially volunteering at a hospi-
tal. Community health centers have been 
increasingly integrated into surge plans in 
many communities to offer primary care 
but gaining participation from private-prac-
tice physicians has been more difficult. 
Opportunities also exist to improve 
public communication to educate and link 
people to appropriate health services to 
help individuals be more self sufficient and 
reduce their reliance on 911 systems and 
emergency departments. joint information 
centers (jICs) allow public information 
officers for hospitals and local agencies to 
provide consistent messages to the public 
in an emergency, including informing the 
public when it is appropriate to seek care at 
a hospital. Also, many communities have 
developed public information campaigns 
and other educational efforts that encour-
age families to create their own disaster 
plans and self-care supply caches. Some 
communities have Web-based systems or 
other technology to help guide people to 
appropriate health care resources, and some 
respondents expressed interest in establish-
ing staffed call centers to provide more per-
sonalized assistance. 
In addition, many communities are 
improving communication with people 
with special needs, including those with 
mental or physical disabilities, the elderly 
and non-english speaking residents. Miami 
and New Orleans collaborate with the 
providers for these groups to ensure their 
patients can be evacuated to special-needs 
shelters rather than hospitals in the event 
of a hurricane or other disaster. Federal 
agencies are working to develop func-
tional definitions for at-risk populations 
to help emergency planners better allocate 
resources according to individuals’ abilities 
and needs.
Implications
Securing adequate surge capacity at the 
community level is difficult and expensive. 
The communities in this study reported 
significant progress in strengthening their 
ability to respond to a large-scale surge in 
injured or ill people, although this level of 
readiness has required hundreds of millions 
of dollars and countless personnel hours 
over nearly a decade to achieve. Declines in 
federal support threaten to divert attention 
from the importance of surge capacity and 
stunt, if not undo, the capacity communi-
ties have built to respond to the next large-
scale disaster. The findings of this study 
provide three important implications for 
policy makers:
First, surge capacity planning, develop-
ment and deployment require broad-based 
support and participation and collaboration 
among many private and public organiza-
tions. efforts to plan, train and exercise 
across sectors as diverse as health care pro-
viders, mortuaries, police, schools, trans-
portation and businesses require resources 
often not included in their respective rev-
enue streams, and additional coordination 
across sectors and jurisdictions. 
Second, policy makers cannot ignore the 
tension created by a competitive health care 
environment in which financing arrange-
ments do not support idle capacity. To the 
extent that policy makers expect surge 
capacity to be available, they need to assure 
adequate funding and guidance. 
Third, until policy makers address the 
many health care workforce challenges 
confronting day-to-day service delivery, the 
ability to have adequate personnel for an 
emergency will be limited. 
Communities fear that attention to surge 
capacity is rapidly waning. Without contin-
ued federal funding and policy attention, 
surge capacity developments and achieve-
ments are likely to erode. 
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